Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1977

State Tax Commission of Utah v. Department of
Finance, State of Utah : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
G. Blaine Davis; Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant;
Joseph P. McCarthy; Attorney for Defendant-Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State Tax Comm. Of Utah v. Dept. of Finance, No. 14658 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/433

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE
STATE OF UTAH

-------------:

STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

•vs-

case No.
14658

DEPARTMENT OP PINANCB,
STATE OP UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent.

- - - - - - - - - ..L-- .:..,~"
BRIEl' 01' RESPONDDT
-----------~---

APPEAL PROM AN ORDER 01' THB TRlRD

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND 1'0.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STA'l'l 01' UTAH 1 · TO
HONORABLE JAMES s. SAWAYA, JUDGB

; '

JOSEPJ! P. MoCAM'RY

'·

Assistant Attorney GeQe#al
236 State Capitol.
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411,4,
Attorney for Respondent

G. BLAINE DAVIS

Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Attorney for Appellant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTEN'.i'S
Page
STATEY\EN'J' OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE-------------- 1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL-------------------------- 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS------------------------------- 2
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE TAX IMPOSED BY UTAH CODE
ANN. § 31-14-4 (1) (b) (1953), AS AMENDED,
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DSPRIVES EMPLOYERS
INSURING HITH THE STATE INSURANCE FUND
OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW AS
DEFINED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 I' THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION, AND THE FOURT ~TH
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF .f'HE
UNITED STATES-------------------------- 4
POINT IT:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-14-4
(1) (b) (1953) I AS A'1ENDED, IS A
SPECIAL LAIV AND IS THEREFORE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL----------------------- 12
POINT III:
RESPONDLiT 1 S c·lOTI001 FOR
SUMMARY JUDGt-1ENT WAS PRO?ERLY GRANTED
IN THE TRIAL COURT--------------------- 15
CONCLUSIO:-.J--------------------------------------- 17

C!< r;s

CITED

Big

Wood Canal Co. v. Unemployment Compensation
Division, 126 P.2d 15, 63 Idaho 785
(1942)--------------------------------- 6,7
Carter v. State Tax Commission, 96 P.2d 727,
98 Utah 96 (1939)---------------------- 7
Chez v. Industrial Commission, 90 Utah 447, 62
?d 549 (1936)------------------------ 2,5,10
Continent< · ~nsurance Co. v.
rnrha, 270 N.l\f. 122,
Neb. 791 (1936) ------------------- 13
Department wf Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 388
P.2d 720, 60 C.2d 716, 36 Cal.Rptr.
488, vacated 380 U.S. 194, on remand
400 P.2d 321, 60 C.2d 586, 43 Cal.Rptr.
329 (1964)----------------------------- 11
Gronning v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977)------ 2,5,10,15,17
Hanson v. Public Employees Retirement System,
246 P.2d 591, 122 Utah 44 (1952)------- 7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-iLibrary Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Cc tinued)
Page
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 u.s. 517 (1933)---------- 8
Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 259 P.2d 297,
123 Utah 289 (1953)-------------------- 15
Perm Phillips Lands v. State Tax Commission,
430 P.2d 349, 247 Ore. 380 (1967)------ 9
Slater v. Salt Lake City, 206 P.2d 153, 115
Utah 476 (1949)------------------------ 6
State v. Kallas, 94 P.2d 414, 97 Utah 492 (1939)- 12
State v. Mason, 78 P.2d 920, 94 Utah 501 (1938)-- 7
State v. North American Car Corp., 164 P.2d
161, 118 Mont. 182 (1945)-------------- 8

STATUTES CITED
Laws
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

of Utah, Chapter 100 (1917)----------------- 10,14
Code Ann. § 31-14-4(1) (b) (1953) ,as amended- 1-4,12-18
Code Ann. § 31-14-4(3) (1953), as amended--- 2,10,12,14,17
Code Ann. § 35-3-1 (1953), as amended------- 10
Code Ann. § 35-3-3 (1953), as amended------- 3

CONSTITUTIONS CITED
Article 1, Section 2, Utah Constitution---------- 4,6
Article VI, Section 26, Utah Constitution-------- 12-14,18
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution- 4,6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding-iifor digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

TE TAX COMMISSION
UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No.
14658

-vsDEPARTMrNT OF FINANCE,
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is brought by the Utah State Tax
Commission from an order of the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting respondent's
Motion for Summary Judgment on all issues and denying the
Tax Comrnission's Motion for Summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that this Court affirm the
decision of the Third Judicial District Court and hold
Utah Code Ann.

§

31-14-4 (1) (b)

(1953), as amended, to be

unconstitutional.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1917, the Legislature created the State Insurance
Fund.

A comprehensive examination of the purposes and the

nature of the Fund have been set out in Chez v. Industrial
Commission, 90 Utah 447, 62 P.2d 549 (1936), and Gronni·
v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977).

Subsequently, the

Legislature provided a 3 1/4 percent tax on the premiums
paid by every insL ance company writi·g workmen's compensation or occupational disease disability insurance as follows:
"Every insurance company
engaged in the transaction of
business in this state writing
workmen's compensation or occupational disease disability insurance
shall pay to the state tax commission,
on or before the thirty-first day of
March in each year, a tax of 3 1/4 %
of the total premiums received by it
during the next preceding calendar
year from workmen's compensation or
occupational disease disability
insurance, subject to all provisions,
limitations and exceptions contained in
this section." Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-4(3)
(1953), as amended.
This section is not contested.
In 1971, the Legislature levied a one percent tax
on the premiumo, paid to the State Insurance Fund in addition
to the 3 1/4 percent tax paid by the Fund and by private
insurers.

Utah Code Ann.

§

31-14-4 (l) (b)

(1953), as

amended, provides for:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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. . a tax of 1% of the total
premiums received bv it during the next
preceding calendar year from insurance
written within this state by any insurance
fund or funds created bv chapter 100, Laws
of Utah 1917, to be collected by the state
tax commission and to cover into the state
treasury to the credit of the state general
fund.
This tax shall be in addition to any
and all taxes levied under this section."
The Code does not levy this additional one percent
premium tax against private insurance companies and, in the
case of self-insured employers, provides for no premium tax
or payment in lieu of tax.
The Department of Finance, acting according to
Utah Code Ann.

§

35-3-3 (1953), on behalf of the Fund, refused

to pay the additional one percent tax. The Tax Commission
then initiated this action to compel payment of the tax.
Based upon defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Third District Court held Utah Code Ann.

§

31-14-l(l) (b}

(1953), unconstitutional and excused the Fund from payment
of the extra one percent premium tax levied therein.
Contesting that decision, the Tax Commission brings this
appeal.
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ARGUMI:NT
POINT I
THE TAX IMPOSED BY UTAH CODE ANN. §
31-14-4 (1) (b) (1953), AS AMENDED,
UNCONSTITuTIONALLY DEI'' eVES EMPLOYERS
IN'·1.'RING \HTH 'L"IIE STAT;~ INSURANCE FUND
OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAH AS DEFicJED
BY ARTICLT:: I, SECT10N 2 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTIOU, AlJD THE FOURTEENTH N!ENDN.ENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES.

Appellant alleges that the tax imposed by Utah
Coc\~

Ann.

§

acceptable.

31-14-4 (1) (b)

(1953),

is constitutionally

It argues that the difference in tax rates

between the Fund and othPr private insurance carriers is
due to additional servj · s and benefits provided the Ft1c1d
by the State and its agencies.

Citing authorities for the

proposition that different classes may be taxed at different
rates, appellant argues that the Fund is in a class separate
from private insurance companies and, thus, subject to
increased taxation.
Respondent asserts that Utah Code Ann.
(1953),

§

31-14-4(1) (b)

and the tax levied exclusively on the State Insuranc ·

Fund therein are repugnant to all notions of equal protection
of the law.

Respondent strongly contends that, in substance,

the State Insurance Fund is identical to private, mutual
insurance carriers.

Being of the same class, the

Fun~

should
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not be taxed at a rate in excess of that provided for
private insurance companies.
In light of this Court's recent decicion in
Gronnin~;

v. Smart, 561 P.2d 690

(Utah 1977), reaffirming

Chez v. Industrial Commission, 90 Utah 447, 62 P.2d 549
(1936), and its consideration of the origin, nature and
purpose of the Fund in conjunection with Gronning, supra,
respondent will just briefly set forth the major features
of the Fund and its function.

The assets of the Fund

belong to contributing employers who pool money in a
State created "mutual insurance

co~rany"

to provide the

means for meeting the employer's obligation to pay awards
to workmen killed or injured on the job or as a result of
an occupational disease.

Gronning v. Smart, 561 P.2d at

692.
In addition to the State Insurance Fund, an
employer may meet his workmen's compensation insurance duty
in two other ways:

(l) by insuring with a private insurance

company writing workmen's compensation and occupational
disease insurance, or (2) through self-insurance.

The

Legislature has •. dxed premiums on each type of insurance
as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(1)

Self-insurance.

There is no premium and

hence no tax.
(2)

Private insurance underwriter.

Premiums

are taxed at 3 1/4 percent.
(3)

State Insurance Fund.

Premiums are taxed

at 3 1/4 percent, as are the premiums of other private
insurers, and at an additional one percent.
Respondent recognizes that the Legislature is
endowed with discretion and pmver to make classifications
for the purposes of taxation but such discretion is not
without constitutional limits.

The Legislature may establish

different classes and provide separate and individual rates
for each class, but it is always bound by the principles of
equality and uniformity.

Big l'7ood Canal

Co. v. Unempl_oyment

Compensation Division, 126 P.2d 15, 63 Idaho 785 (1942).
Therefore, upon judicial review, the Supreme Court will not
concern itself with the policy or wisdom of legislative
classifications, but functions to determine whether such
classifications operate equally on all persons similarly
situated.

Slater v. Salt Lake City, 206 P.2d 153, 115

Utah 476 (1949).
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted the equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of the Utah
Constitution as being abridged when an unreasonable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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excluded from an act whether the act confers a privilege
or a right or imposes a duty or an obligation."

State v.

1-lason, 78 P.2d 920, 94 Utah SOl (1938), 78 P.2d at 922.
Discri10ination results when a law is inclusive as to some
class or group and as to serve human relationships,
transactions, or functions and exclusive as to the remainder.
For that reason, for a classification to be unconstitutionally
discriminatory, it must be arbitrary and unreasonable.
State v. Hasen, supra; Hanson v. Public Employees Retirement
System, 246 P.2d 591, 122 Utah 44

(1952).

This Court has

adjudged a law to be arbitrary and unreasonable where some
persons or transactions included in the operation of the law
are, as to subject matter, in no differentiable class from
those excluded from its operation, and if

no

reasonable

basis to differentiate those excluded from those included
in its operation can be found, it must be held unconstitutional.
State v. Nason, supra; Big Wood Canal Co., supra; Carter v.
State Tax Commission, 96 P.2d 727, 98 Utah 96 (1939).

The

Carter Court stated:
"It is equally well settled
that a statute makes an improper
and unlawful discrimination if it
confers particular privileges upon
a class arbitrarily selected from a
larger number of persons, all of
whom stand in the same relation to
the privileges granted, and
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whom and tl
person not so
favou_j no reasoi• 'Jle distinction or
subo;tantial diff(· ,,nee can be found
jusLifying the in~lusion of one and
the exclusion of the other." 96
P.2d at 732.
betwe~n

The courts have found a violatlon of the equal
protection standard in several cases g•
to the instant case.

rally analoguus

In Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517

(1933), the United States Supreme Court examined a Florida
statute taxing chain stores.

The statute provided a set

tax for each store of the same chain within the same
county.

Hu..;ever, \-Then a new store was opened in a different

county, a higher

~ax

was imposed upon the new store and upon

all other stores within the original county.

The Supreme

Court found this statute arbitrary, and void, determining
that the county line furnishes no rational basis for such a
classification.
In State v. North American Car Corp., 164 P.2d
161, 118 Mont. 182 (1945), the Supreme Court of Montana
considered a grolp of statutory provisions taxing railroad
frei<Jht cars.

Freight cars owned by common-carrier railroads

not operating within ';ontana but which were furnished by such
carriers, for compensation, to con®on carrier railroads
operating within the State were taxed at a higher rate
than freight cars owned by
within Montana.

corr~on-carrier

railroads operating

The cars were of similar nature, kind,
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

utilization and

'assifica~ion.

The Montana Court found

such a class to be arbitrary and constitutionally
discriminatory, stating:
. any tax against the same
kind of property used for idential
purposes is not uniform when a different
valuation and a different rate is applied
to two distinct taxpayers, separately
distinguish2ble only in name, and the
tax being imposed by the same taxing
district." 164 P.2d at 166.
Finally, in Perm Phillips

~ands

v. State Tax

Commission, 430 P.2d 349, 247 Ore. 380 (1967), the Oregon
Supreme Court considered a case

whe~e

the taxpayer's real

estate was reappraised at a rate of $60.00 per acre while
neighboring lands appraised at not

~ore

than $5.00 per acre.

The taxpayer's land was indistinguishable from that of his
neighbors', the court noting only that the taxpayer designated
his land as "homesites" and had invested considerable amounts
of sales promotion.

The Oreg··

Court found the higher rate

applied to taxpayer to be unconstitutionally discriminatory as
taxpayer's "class" was arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the instant case, the State Insurance Fund has
be· ' singled out from among a larger class of insurers to
pay a tax imposed upon no one else.

Respondent asserts that

this tax is arbitrary and constitutionally prohibite •.
The State Insurance Fund is just one of a larger
class of workmen's compensation and occupational disease
insurance writers.

The assets of the Fund exist only to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Fund has the same administrative costs as private insurers:
establishment of premium and hazard rates, procedures for
analyzin~

claims and making disbursements, reinsurance

considerations, Fund investment decisions, collection
procedure~

legal fees and policy issuance.

These administrative

costs, as well as many other administration related expenses,
are deducted from the Fund by the Legislature's appropriations
of Fund money in accordance with Utah Code Ann.
as amended.

§

35-3-1

(1953),

The Fund has the same rights to sue and be sued

and makes contracts that a private

i~surer

has.

The Fund

enjoys no immunities not provided for the private insurer.
In essence, the State Insurance Fund is indistinguishable
from private insurance writers, the only difference being
its administration by a State agency.
Appellant contends that the Fund is a separate and
valid class for tax purposes being one of "any insurance
fundorfunds created by Chapter 100, La\vs of Utah, 1917."
This "class" is fictitious as there is only one fund (the
State Insurance Fund), created by Chapter 100, Laws of Utah
1917, such being the case.for sixty years.
As this Court determined in Chez v. Industrial
Commission, supra

and Gronning v. Smart, supra, the Fund

is a mutual insurance company and properly belongs to the
class designated by Utah Code Ann.

§

31-14-4(3)

(1953).
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Appcllflnt's argument infccs that the additional tax
could be justified on a de minimus theory.

Ap•

llant argues

that respondent's operating costs are lower than those of
private insurers and, therefore, it is only fair to tax
it at a higher rate in order to equaliz0 their relative
financial positions.

The record does not support this con-

tention and respondent's supposed ability to pay does not
establish sufficient differentiation to justify a separate
class for taxation purposes.

As the California Supreme

Court stated in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner,
388 P.2c 720, 60

C.2d 716, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, vacatec

380 U.S. 194, on remand 400 P.2d 321, 60 C.2d 58G, t3 Cal.
Rptr. 329

(1964):
. the mere presence
of wealth or lack thereof .
cannot be the basis for valid
class discrimination." 388 P.2d
at 723.
From the foregoing, it is clear that there are no

natural, intrinsic or fundamental differences between the
Fund and private insurance writers.

To provide an additional

tax exclusively for the Fund without clearly establishing the
necessary differences is arbitrary and unreasonable, and
respondent asserts, a violation of equal protection of the law.
Respondent makes one additional point. Self-insurers pay
no prewium tax.

Failure to secure an equivalent tax from self-

insurers denies employers insuring with the Fund and private
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
The law
Library Services andequal
Technology protection
Act, administered by theof
Utah State
insurance companies
theLibrary.
law.
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favors

sufficienl assets t:c' be self-insur<'cl.
of Utah Code Ann.

§

31-14- · (1953), may he
POil

C'V<"'n

ITtOrc

rlcnJbtful.

li

UTAH CODE Arm. §31-14-4 (1) (b) (1953)
AS N1ENDED, IS A SPECIAL Ll\\·1 AND IS
THEREFORE U~CO~STITUTIO~AL.
Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah Cons lei tution
presently provides that,

"No private or special law shall

be enacted where a general law can be applicable."

This

1972 Amendment replaced the former section which enum·:crated
spec:ific cases in \·lhich the Legislature was prohibited from
enacting private or special law, and also provided that in
"all cases where a general law can be applicable, no special
lav; shall be enacted."
In State v. Kallas, 94 P.2d 414, 97 Utah 492
this Court set fortL definitions

of

(1939),

special and general laws

as follov1s:
"Laws which apply to and operate
uniforQly upon all members of any class
of persons, places, or things requiring
legislation peculiar to themselves in the
matters covered by the laws in question,
are general and not special.
. Special
legislation is such as relates either to
particular persons, places, or things, or
to persons, places, or things which, though
not particularized, are separated by any
method of selection from the whole class
to which the law might, but for such legislation, be applied,
" 94 P.2d at 421.
Article VI, Section 26 was designed and

enact~>d

to

prevent the Legislature from singling out special interest
groups for special treatwent;

treatment either favorable or
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unfQVOr~bln.
c~se

Special laws are therefore prohibited in any

where a general law is applicable.

It is also clear

that legislation which violates the prohibition against
special or private laws may also run afoul with the equal
protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
l1n example of an improper special law is set forth
in Continental Insurance Co. v. Srnrha , 270 N.W. 122, 131
lJeb. 791 (1936).

The llebraska Supren:e Court held a 2% tax

on premiums received on fire insurance to be distributed
to cities and villages to maintain

~ire

departments to be

invalid stating:
"It necessarily follo~s that the law
is not general but special w~ich does not
operate uniformly upo~ the class within the
relations or circumstances provided for."
2 7 0 ll • 1'1. at 12 4 .
Respondent contends that Utah Code Ann. §31-14-4
(1)

(b) (l9S3), as amended, is a special law in violation of

Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah Constitution.

The State

Insurance Fund is engaged solely in the business of writing
workmen's compensation and occupational disease disability
insurance.

As such, it

i~

part of a larger class of work-

men's compensation insurers.

The Fund is indistinguishable

from the larger class of private insurers in terms of its
intrinsic purpose and operation.

It is distinguishable

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

perhaps only by the fuct that it is State administered.
'rherefore, lx"ing just one of many "mutual insurance cc.,npanies", the Fund clearly should be tn.xed under the general
law applicable to all workmen's compensation
Code Ann. §31-14-4(3).
additional

1~

insurer~;

Utah

But the Fund is also taxed an

under Utah Code Ann. §31-14-4(1) (b).

section (1) (b), creat0d to tax".

Sub-

any insurance fund

or funds created by Chapter 100, Laws of Utah, 1917," can
only be applied to the State Insurance Fund.

Thus, Utah

Code Ann, §31-14-4 (1) (b) (1953), as a.;-::ended, is a special
law in that it operates

exclusivel~

u~on

one insurer,

indistinguishable from the entire class, to which the
general law would, but for such law, te applied.
clearly violates

~rticle

Such a law

VI, Section 26 of the Utah Constitu-

tion and is therefore void.

-14-
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POIN'l' III
REPSO!WF:i-:T' S flOTIOtl FOE SUi'ii11\FY JUDG:IJ:::IJT
\VAS PROJ' L:Rl.Y GPJ1U'i'L:D Ill ';'!If; TIUAL COUR'L'.

Appellant contends that the trial .:ourt erred
in its grani:ing of ccefendant 's ilotion for Summary Jucgment
because genuine issu~s of fact existed which needed to
be revolved before a sur;unary judgment could be granted in
favor of the

Departr~nt

of Finance.

A Motion for Surrunary Judgment is properly granted
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the

movi~g

of lavl.
289

party is entitled to such a judgment as a matter

:!orris v. Farnsworth Motel,

(1953).

Judgment

~as

259 P.2d 297, 123 Utah

ResponC::ent asserts thu_t its 1-'loticr. £or Su:-nrnary

properly granted as there was no genuine issue

as to any material fact.
This Court is thoroughly familiar with the laws
relating to the

Stat~

Insurance Fund having recently examined

extensive briefs and heard considerable argument from the
Fund,

the Industrial Conmission and from various employc:rs

who filed briefs as
supra.

'micus curiae in Gronning v. Smart,

The: essential quc;stion presented in the instant

case is whether the Legislature can impose a 1% premium
tax only upon the State Insurance Fund.

'i'his is a qu' -:tion

of law v1llich was properly resolved in a summary proceeding
in the trial court.
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Appellant

:':0'.1

attc:n]': ·; to

i.H"CJUC

thctl. <Jenui.nc

factuo.l questions e:·:ist and t:l1ul it could sho•.. · fucto; under
which it would be entitled to judgment.

Rc,.;pon<lent notc;s

that pluintiff motioned the tri<tl court for summary
in its favor at the same

ti~e

defendant did.

jud<JW~nt

Appcllunt.

cannot now, on appeal, object to the relief granted defend .. ,
in the trial court Khen it sought the exact same type of
relief through an identical motion.

By motioning the trial

court for sur:u'Uary juC:gment, plaintiff asserted that no
material factual questions existed.
were no

s~bstantial

Obviously, if there

issues of fact then, there are none now.

This court has consistently prohibited litigants
from raising objections on appeal which were not raised in
the trial court.

To entertain appellant's argument concern-

ing the propriety of summary jud<jment I'IOuld run directly
contrary to this notion, considering the fact that summary
judgment was the same motion it sought in the trial court.
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COHCLUS lOll
In Gror>'_'ng v. Smart, supra, the Supreme Court
held that a legislative appropriation of State Insurance
Fund assets

for the payment of obligations incurred by the

State in the discharge of its police power denied the Fund
and its members due process of law.

In Gronning, the Court

found it unnecessary to consiccr the issue of equal protection,
but this case squarely puts that issue.

In addition, this

case raises the issue of the co:-tstitutionality of a special
law.
In Gronnin9, this Court refused to penni t a
legislative ''raid" of Fund assets for non-insurance purposes.
Through the artful use of language, the Legislature now seeks
to put the Fund into a separate classification in order to
grasp part of its premiums, thus imposin9 a tax penalty upon
these employers Hho choose or 1·1ho are compelled to insure with
the Fund.

Respondent argues that the Fund cannot

constitu-

tionally be placed in a class separate from other "mutual
insurance companies" in that no intrinsic differences separate
it therefrom.

To allow such a fictitious classification

is arbitrary and a denial of equal protection on the law.
Utah Code Ann. §31-14-4 (3) (1953)

taxes all workmen • s

compensation insurers at a uniform rate, yet subsection (1) (b)
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.

provides an additional tax applicable only to a single
i•,3urcr, the State Insurance Fund.

Utah Code Ann. §31-14-4

(l)(b)(l''>3), as amcnucc1, is a special or private la11 and
is prohibited by Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah Constitution.
This Court should protect the Fund from unconstitional levies as it has heretofore protected the Fund from
unlawful confiscation and depletion.
Respect~ully

submitted,

JOSEPH P. HcCARTHY
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Ca0itol
Salt Lake ciiy, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent
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